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countries  concerns  the appropriate  degree  of reliance  on the  private  sector
and  on private  spending  for  the  provision  of health  care.  Proponents  of user
charges  and greater  privatization  claim  that  these  will conserve  scarce  public
funds  and  promote  efficiency  in the  sense  of cost-effectiveness  and
responsiveness  to consumer  preferences  (Akin,  Birdsall,  and  de Ferranti,  1987;
Jimenez,  1987). Opponents  retort  with two  arguments. First  is an efficiency
and effectiveness  argument: that  in the  past  in developing  countries,  the
public  soctor  has  been successful  in  health. Second  is an equity  argument:
that  because  of their  reliance  on ability  to  pay as a rationing  criterion,
user charges  for  public  services  and  privatization  will have  negative
distributional  effects  that  are likely  to outweigh  any  efficiency  gains (e.g.,
see  Gertler  et al, 1987,  and  Gertler  and  van der  Gaag,  1988  on user charges
for  health  care in Peru  and  Cote  d'Ivoire).
In this  paper,  we argue  that  neither  argument  is correct  given
current  and  likely  future  trends  --  and that  there  is a case for  limited  and
selective  use  of user charges  and  privatization  of  health  in  most developing
countries. In Section  I  we set  forth  a brief  statement  of public  choice
theory,  which predicts  that,  in general,  government  actions  may be neither
efficient  nor equitable. Instead,  they  may be directed  toward  increasing  the
real  income  of influential  middle  and  upper  income  groups,  often  in
inefficient  ways.  Section  II draws,  as a central  point  of this  paper,  an
important  corollary  of public  choice  theory  for  the  health  field: that  the
past successes  of the  public  sector  are  not likely  to be repeated  in the
future. The  reason  is an increasing  tension  between  the  health  needs  of the
rich  versus  the  poor,  with the  greatest  potential  mortality  gains  coming  from
attention  to the latter  but  political  forces  often  dictating  a flow  of
resources  to Lhe  former. Part  III  provides  ntumerous  examples  of this
misallocation  and  suggests  ways that  selective  use of fees  and  privatization
may improve  equity,  efficiency  and  returns  to future  public  health  spending.
In the  conclusion,  we summarize  the  crux  of the  political  economy
problem  brought  out  in the  earlier  sections. If the inefficiency  and inequity2
of government  health  programs  are  endogenous  and  politically  deLermined,  how
can  they  be fixed? How do  we break  into  the  chain  of causation  and  bring
about  a  new equilibrium,  more efficient  and  more redistributive,  when this  was
apparently  not in the  interest  of the  main actors,  or it  would  already  have
happened?
I.  Why is Government  Health  Spending  Both Inefficient  and Inequitable?
Why are  governments  often  inefficient  and inequitable? This
section  contrasts  a  normative  (welfare  theory)  and  positive  (public  choice
theory)  approach  to government  behavior,  and  argues  that the  pessimistic
conclusions  of the  latter  are  most applicable  to developing  countries. The
following  section  extends  public  choice  theory  to the  health  sector  in
developing  countries  and  shows  how it implies  a deteriorating  effectiveness  of
government  spending,  a  need to place  greater  reliance  on private  spending,  in
ordsr  to improve  both efficiency  and  equity.
Welfare  Theory  vs. Public  Choice  Theory
Classical  welfare  theory  gives  us a normative  view of what
government  should  do.  The  main economic  role  of government  is to correct
market  failure  by funding  public  goods,  by subsidizing  (or  taxing)  goode  that
generate  (positive  or negative)  externalities,  by compensating  for  capital
market  or insurance  market  failure,  and  otherwise  simply  to set  the framework
within  which  private  enterprise  will function.'
With respect  to distribution,  the  "maximum"  point  of social
welfare  is acknowledged  by most economists  to depend  on equity  as  well as
efficiency. Opinions  vary  widely  on  whether  a "social  welfare  function"
exists,  what an "equitable"  distribution  would  be,  and  whether  it is  possible
' When efforts  of government  to correct  for  market  failure  in themselves
introduce some efficiency losses --  because of  transaction  costs or  the
distortionary  effects  of taxes  --  we are operating  in a second-best  world in
which  the  benefits  of intervention  must  be  weighed  against  the  costs. But  much
of classical  welfare theory  can nevertheless  be depicted  as a pursuit  of the
first-best.3
to aggregate diverse preferences to  get  a  consensus  on this matter. 2
However,  despite  this ambivalence  about  the  redistributive  role  of government,
most economists  agree  that,  if there  is  to be any redistribution,  it  should  be
from  rich to poor  and  not  vice  versa  --  the "Robin  Hood"  function  of
government  (Birdsall,  1992). We use the  term "equity'  as  shortened  for  Robin
Hood redistributions  in the  paper.
A  second,  more recent  and  less  benevolent  view of government
activities  stems  from  public  choice  theory,  which  gives  us a positive  model  of
what the  government  will do,  under  the  presumption  that the  chief  agents  act
to maximize  individual  utility  rather  than  social  welfare. According  to this
theory,  politicians  do not  seek  to maximize  efficiency  but rather  to  maximize
their  own chances  of staying --.  power;  bureaucrats  seek  to  maximize  their
budgets;  and  individuals  use governments  to augment  their  real income  via the
creation  of  protected  market  positions  and  the  direct  provision  of services
and  transfers. 3
Politicians  and  political  parties  have some  discretionary  power
because  of barriers  to entry  and  because  they  are in  a position  to shape  as
well as respond  to people's  tastes. At the  same  time,  threats  from  actual  or
potential  competitors  limit  the scope  of their  monopoly  power.  Thus  natural
2  A  vast literature  has developed on the question  of whether actual
compensation  or simply  the  potential  for  compensation  should  be  used to  compare
the relative  desirability  of two alternative  allocations. In the later+  case
distribution  is essentially  deemed  as irrelevant,  while in the former  case  the
nature  of compensatory  mechanisms  is crucial.  Opinions  vary on how much the
government  should  intervene  to  alter  the  market  distribution  (see  Rawls,  1971  and
Nozick, 1974 for strongly contrasting  views).  The strongest  advocates of
redistribution  argue  that  it  is  justified  on  efficiency  as  well  as  equity  grounds
--  if  people  care  about  the  utility  of others  or if  there  exists  a set  of "merit
goods"  (health,  education)  about  which  society  does  not  trust  consumers  to  make
the "right"  consumption  decisions (Meade,  1964;  Musgrave, 1959; Hochman and
Rogers, 1969).  Skeptics point to the  lack of consensus on the desired
distribution  and to the disincentive  effects  of redistribution. Bourgignon,
1989,  for example,  sets out a model in which the pursuit of equity,  through
education  and health programs  that build human capital or through transfer
programs  such  as  food  subsidies  for  the  poor,  requires  that  governments  generate
tax  revenues,  which reduce  overall  efficiency.
3  For fuller summaries  of public choice theory see Mueller, 1979 and
Borcherding,  1985.4
selection  operates  in political  life  as  well as in economic  or  biological
life. Viewing  the  entire  spectrum  of  issues,  among  whlich  different  groups  of
voters  have different  trade-offs,  politicians  who survive  to  make  policy  are
th  -who assess  these  trade-offs  correctly  and  give influential  groups  what
they  want on issues  that  are  most salient  to them. Where democracy  does  not
exist,  a similar  process  often  occurs,  but  -Tith  greater  discretionary  monopoly
powers  for  government  officia7.s  who control  the  political  market.
Public  policies  designed  to  maximize  private  interests  will not
necessarily  be inefficient. Indeed,  politically  influential  groups  would  have
a potentially  larger  pie  to capture  if the  Pareto  frontier  were reached;
compensatory  mechanisms  could  then  make everyone  better  off.  Taxes  could  be
imposed  on some (less  influential  groups)  and transferred  to others.
However,  the  allocation  of resources  resulting  from  public  choice
politics  often  is inefficient,  for  the following  reasons:
1.  Veil  of ignorance. In a context  of imperfect  information,
people  may  not kr.ow  the  degree  and  direction  of redistribution  going  on.  If
well-defined  groups  know  they  are "losers"  they  are  more likely  to  mobilize
and foment  opposition  to existing  policies;  therefore  the "gainers"  benefit
from  perpetuating  a "veil  of ignorance." Suppose  that  the  most efficient  form
of transfers  is also  more obvious  (e  g. transfers  in cash  are  more transparent
than  those  in  kind).  In that  case,  efficiency  impcses  cost  to the  "gainers"
by reducing  the  amount  they  will  be potentially  able to extract;  they  are
therefore  likely  to choose  inefficient  transfer  mechanisms. Most commonly,
some  private  goods  may be publicly  provided  and oversupplied  because  they
benefit  a politically  influential  group  of  people  in a non-obvious  way (see
Becker,  1983  and  Borcherding  et al., 1983).
2.  Fiscal  illusion. Our  second  point  is closely  related:
Imperfect  information  and  uncertainty  also  surround  the  relationship  between
the  tax structure  and the  bundle  of public  services  provided. While these  may
be interdependent  components  of a long  run  political  equilibrium  (e.g.  if the
benefits  of a group  rise,  its  tax  burden  may also  rise),  taxes  and services5
may appear  to be independent  of each  other  in the  short  run --  a kind  of
"fiscal  illusion." In that  case,  some  public  or quasi-public  goods  may be
undersupplied  because  their  benefits  accrue  to dispersed,  less influential
individuals,  and it  is not clear  (to  the  influential  "loser")  that the  tax
share  of the  gainers  can  be adjusted  upward  commensurately  with their
benefits. Similarly,  some  goods  may  be oversupplied  because  their  chief
beneficiaries  are  politically  powerful,  and these  groups  expect  to avoid  much
of the tax  burden.'
3. High costs  of  public  sector  provision. The  real  costs  of
publicly-produced  private  goods  may be above  minimal  levels,  because
government  imposes  bureaucratic  rules  and  red  tape (in  part as a  substitute
for  the  profit  motive)  and  often  lacks  competitive  pressures  for  internal
efficiency  (perhaps  because  politicians  reap  a  surplus  from  monopolistic
provision). Heads  of bureaucratic  agencies  who wish to  maximize  their
prestige  and  perks,  and  have greater  information  than  the  politicians  and
citizens  they  supposedly  serve,  are  often  able to  argue  successfully  for
larger  budgets  than  are  needed  for  least-cost  production. In addition,
distortionary  tax  financing  also raises  the  non-program  costs  of publicly-
produced  private  goods  (Niscanen,  1971;  Romer  and  Rosenthal,  1978;
Borcherding,  Pommerehne  and  Schneider,  1983).5
4. Rent-seeking. The  diversion  of entrepreneurial  energies  toward
extracting  a surplus  from  public  agencies  rather  than  toward  productivity-
enhancing  market  activities  also impedes  private  sector  efficiency  and  growth.
4  For an early  statement  of the fiscal  illusion  argument,  see Buchanan,
1967;  for a  more recent  review,  see  Pommerehne  and  Schneider,  1978.
5  Program costs may exceed  minimal levels even when politicians  and
bureaucrats  wish to choose  an efficient  product  and factor  mix.  The non-price
rationing  which  often  exists  for  distributional  reasons  under  public  funding,  and
the  civil  service  procedures  governing  wages,  hiring  and  firing  procedures  which
substitute  for  managerial  discretion  under  public  production,  mean that  prices
do not serve  as a measure  of the  real  benefits  and  costs  of a program,  as they
do in the  private  market.6
Rent-seeking  activities  thus  misallocate  private  as  well as public  resources
(Krueger,  1974;  Buchanan,  Tollison  and  Tullock,  1980).
The resulting  distribution  of real incorae  is likely  to depend  upon
political  power  as  well as  market  power.  Political  power,  of course,  will
vary across  societies  and  through  time  depending  on the  size of different
producer  and  consumer  groups,  the  coalitions  among  them,  and the  long  run
"rules  of the  game"  that  have  been set  up (e.g.  through  constitutions)  for
allocating  voting  rights. Given  that  the  distribution  of  voting  rights  is
ordinarily  more equal  than  the  distribution  of income,  one  might  expect
political  decision-making  to be relatively  egalitarian.'  However,  low  income
people  often  do not  vote and  economic  power  can  also  buy political  power,  as
through  campaign  contributions  and  purchases  of  media influence  that shape
other  people's  votes.  Since  producer  groups  are  likely  to  be more
concentrated  and  better  organized  than  consumer  groups,  since  upper  and  middle
income  groups  are  generally  more articulate  and  politically  active  than  poorer
groups,  and since  lines  of communications  and  mobility  often  are strong
between  government  agencies,  their  bureaucratic  chiefs,  and the  private
industries  or professions  they supposedly  regulate,  public  choice  thaory
predicts  that  producer  and  upper  income  groups  will  benefit  disproportionately
from implemented  government  policies  (see  Stigler,  1970,  1971;  Peltzman,  1976,
1980;  Fiorina  and  Noll,  1978),
Public  Choice  in  Developing  Countries
How could  we expect  these  divergent  forces  to sort themselves  out
in the  developing  country  context? On the  one  hand,  the  gulf  between  rich  and
poor and the  relative  number  of poor  people  are  much greater  there,  so  under
"one  man, one  vote"  we would  expect  to find  the  poor  gaining  from  politically
induced  redistributions.  Indeed,  in  a few  countries  (e.g.,  Malaysia)  an
economically  disadvantaged  group  has  effectively  used its  political  advantage
6 Thus,  Meltzer  and  Richard  (1978,  1981)  have  argued  that  redistribution  is
likely  to flow  to L"'e  median  voter  whose  income  is generally  less  than  average,
and  Demsetz  (1982) -ies  this  tendency  to the  extension  of the  franchise.7
to increase  its share  of the  national  income. However,  differences  in
education,  hence  in  organizational  and  communication  skills,  are also  much
greater  in developing  countries,  and  democratic  institutions  are often
primitive,  limiting  the  power  of the  poor. We would expect  the latter
tendency  to dominate  in  most cases.
This is not  to say  thet  there  will be no redistribution  to the
poorer  classes. In fact,  even  when the  rich  are in  control  we would  expect  to
find  some such  redistribution  of income. For  example,  people  voluntarily
donate  to beggars  and  use  the  government  as an efficient  mechanism  for
donating  to disadvantaged  groups,  in  part  because  the  extremes  of poverty  and
socioeconomic  immobility  raise  fears  of crime  or revolution  which  will
ultimately  hurt  the rich.  In developed  countries,  historically,  the  provision
of certain  merit  goods  to the  poor (e.g.,  basic  health  and  education  services,
social  insurance)  has  been  viewed  as an effective  way to combat  these
problems.
In addition,  in developing  countries,  where there  are  many more
poor people  than  rich,  the  desire  to constrain  the  popularity  of opposition
groups  encourages  some  distribution  to lower  income  groups  on grounds  of
expediency. Out-of-power  groups  must  be appeased  by giving  them  "just  enough"
to prevent  opposition  parties  from  gaining  strong  support  (a  "contestable
market"  view of political  equilibrium).  But "just  enough"  may not  be very
much.  For  example,  it  may imply  that  the  poor are  given  large  amounts  of low
cost services  or are  given  very limited  access  to  high cost  services  from
which  the rich  are  the  main  beneficiaries. Governmental  expenditures  on high
quantity,  low  quality  primary  level  school  systems  and on selective  high cost
universities  are common  illustrations  of these  two  phenomena.
In short,  in  many situations,  perverse  distributional  rather  than
efficiency  or equity  criteria  determine  the  allocation  of government  funds,
and these  criteria  imply  large  benefits  to powerful  upper  income  groups,8
combined  with small  redistributions  to the  poor.
7 We believe  these
pessimistic  predictions  of public  choice  theory  are  consistent  with the
observed  actions  of developing  countrtes  in health  today.
I.  Future  Effe:tiveness  of Governrmient  Spendinrp  on Health
There  is little  doubt  that  governments  have played  a  major  role in
bringing  about  extraordinary  postwar  mortality  decline  and  the  accompanying
improvements  in health  in developing  countries  (see  Table 1)  --  most obviously
through  direct  interventions  such  as immunizations  and  malaria  control,  but
also  through  more general  public  investments  in education,  sanitation,  and
improved  communications  and transportation,  which  have  reduced  the  mortality
toll  once  taken  by limited  information  and  periodic  famine. 8
Can the  past success  of governmentp  in reducing  mortality  and
improving  health  be maintained? In this section  we argue  that,  on grounds  of
public  choice  theory,  there  are  strong  reasons  for  doubt  about  the  future
contribution  of &overnment. Past  gains  have  come from  expenditures  that
benefitted  a  wide spectrum  of the  population. But future  gains  will require
additional  expenditures  targeted  toward  the  poor,  behavioral  changes  among  the
poor,  and, indeed,  the  elimination  of some  aspects  of poverty. But, for  the
very reasons  given  above  in Section  I, governments  are  unlikely  to spend
disproportionately  on the  poor,  and  the  behavior  of the  poor is  unlikely  to
change  rapidly;  hence  the  gains  of the  past  are  unlikely  to continue  in the
future,  if the  burden  remains  on government's  shoulders.
This tension  between  rich  and  poor  is exacerbated  by the  tension  between
old and  young. As the  population  ages,  its  disease  profile  changes;  the
prevalence  of cancer,  heart  disease  and  other  diseases  of adulthood  and old
7  For this result  with respect to public expenditures  on education in
Brazil,  see  Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1988.
'  See  Birdsall,  1989  for  discussion,  data  and  citations  on this  point.9
age increases. 9 These are expensive diseases to treat, requiring
hospitalization and modern technology, in comparison to the relatively low
cost of inoculating children against measles and polio.' 0 This fact alone
would tend to reduce the rate of return to public health expenditures, unless
these  continue  to be spent  on preventing  diseases  of the  young  and  are  not
heavily  siphoned  off to treating  diseases  of the  old.
But public choice theory again tells us that this is unlikely to
be the case:  Children do not vote or make political contributions, as older
people  do.  Moreover,  their  parents  come  disproportionately  from lower  income
groups  (where  birth  rates  are  higher),  while  people  who live  to adulthood  and
old age  come  disproportionately  from  middle  and  upper  income  groups  (where
life  expectancy  is longer,  in  part  because  they  have enjoyed  better  health
care)."  Thus,  the  latter  are  likely  to  win in the  competitive  struggle  for
public  health  resources  against  the  children  and their  parents. While  this
scenario  applies  to some  developed  countries,  it  also gives  us another
powerful  reason  for  predicting  that  the  past  successes  of the  government  in
9  Feachem  et al. (forthcoming)  provide  an assessment  of how to meet the
health  needs  of adult  populations  in developing  countries.
10  This is  not  to  say  that  the  cost-effectiveness  of treating  all  childhood
diseases  is higher  than  the  cost-effectiveness  of treating  all adult  diseases.
Jamison and Mosley  (1991) point out  that among the most  cost-effective
interventions  in developing  countries  are such adult  health  interventions  as
anti-smoking  campaigns  plus  tobacco  taxes,  passive  case  finding  and  short-course
chemotherapy  for  tuberculosis,  and  use  of condoms  to  prevent  HIV  transmission.
However,  because  many other  adult  health  interventions  are  so  costly,  and  given
the increasing  burden  of chronic  diseases  as populations  age,  the  authors  also
note that  this  increasing  burden  is "initially  likely  to affect  the relatively
more affluent  and politically  vocal older groups  who are growing  in numbers.
This  being  the  case,  governments  will  need  to  take  great  care  to assure  that  the
infectious  diseases  which predominantly  affect  children  and the poor are not
neglected  in the face of resource  demands  placed  in large  measure  by the  more
affluent."
1"  Preston (1984)  makes this point in explaining  the shift in public
spending  from  the  young  to  the  old  in  the  United  States. This  description  of low
and  high  income  groups  is  based  on  lifetime  income. In terms  of  current  income,
parents  of  young  children  and  older  age  groups  are  both  at  relatively  low  points
on their  age-earnings  profiles,  while  middle-age  adults  are  at relatively  high
points.  However, the current  income  and asset situation  of the parents is
probably  worst  of  all  since  older  people  with  high  lifetime  incomes  have  at  least
had  the  opportunity  to save.10
reducing mortality will not be maintained in the future in many developing
countries.
These arguments are developed in further detail below.
The Correlation Between Mortality and Poverty
The most obvious success of the state in reducing mortality in
developing countries has come via programs based on new technologies, programs
to immunize people and to control malaria and other endemic diseases.  In some
cases (e.g.,  malaria control), these programs provided "public goods" that
were automatically available to all.  In other cases (e.g., immunizations),
they provided "quasi-public goods" that were ostensibly available to all but,
in fact, had a large private component that was rationed to the people
(typically middle and upper class) who were most likely to perceive and
capture these benefits.  This was the easiest clientele to reach and serve,
hence such expenditures bore a high rate of return, as well as strong
political support.
Further mortality declines will be much harder to achieve; they
will depend much more than in the past on behavioral changes, particularly
among people who are the most resistant to such change --  i.e., the poor and
uneducated --  and on public expenditures specifically targeted toward these
groups.' 2 Moreover, these are the politically disenfranchised groups in many
societies.  Thus, such policies will be costlier, will bear a lower rate of
return and, for political economy reasons, are unlikely to be adopted.
What is the evidence that further mortality declines will be
harder to achieve --  because they  will have to reach the poor?  First, within
developing countries, the differentials in mortality associated with income
and other measures of socioeconomic status have persisted, even where overall
12  Hill  and Pebley (1988) report that over the past 25 years, there has not
been stagnation in  the pace of  mortality decline.  However, the pace of  mortality
decline has been mcrkedly lower in Africa than in other regions; this was true
even before the economic crisis of the 1980s.  Mosley et al.  (1990) note the
difficulty in Africa of reducing mortality, where reductions "from diarrhea and
acute  respiratory  infections  will  require  increased  food  production,
environmental improvements, and behavioral changes, along with improvements in
the efficiency and effectiveness of the health system." (p. 350)11
mortality has fallen substantially.  In Brazil, deaths from infectious and
parasitic diseases have declined drastically.  These accounted for 45% of all
deaths in 1930 but only 11% in 1980.1' Other causes of death, however, are
highly concentrated among the poor.  Infant mortality rates among the rural
poor in the northeast are two to three times higher than rates in the
wealthier more urbanized south.  For eight developing countries where
households were surveyed in the mid-1980s, infant mortality among mothers with
no education was two to three times higher than among mothers with secondary
education and three to six times higher than among mothers with more than
secondary education.  (Mosley et al., 1990)  These continuing differences
suggest that progress in reducing mortality among the very poor and uneducated
requires new, and probably more expensive, initiatives than those that
succeeded in reducing aggregate mortality in the past.
Second is a difference in the nature of diseases that kill people
between developing countries today and developed countries when they were at
similar overall mortality levels.  For example, mortality from diarrhea in the
developing world is two to three times as high as it was in the West when
overall mortality levels were similar, in large part because prevalence of
other diseases has been reduced by technological interventions (see Figure 1).
Diarrhea is a disease of the poor; it is found along with, and contributes to,
malnutrition and is caused by lack of access to clean water, simple health
services, and basic education.  To date, diarrhea has been relatively
impervious to the programs and technologies that have reduced other causes of
mortality.  Some hope that the "new technology" of oral rehydration therapy
(ORT) can reduce mortality due to diarrhea, but use of ORT itself requires
change in the behavior of mothers and other caretakers.  Moreover, it is not
clear that repeated handling of diarrhea through ORT actually reduces
'3  Briscoe,  1990.12
mortality  in environments  in  which  infants  are  likely  to  die from  other
diseases  of poverty. 14
Third  is evidence  across  countries  of continuing  huge disparities
in disease  risks,  including  risk  of chronic  disease,  that  are  also  clearly
associated  with overall  differences  in income,  education,  and  the
effectiveness  of  public  health  infrastructure.  For  example,  the  annual  risk
of infection  from  tuberculosis  is 50 to  200 times  greater  in  developing
compared  to developed  countries  (Mosley  et al., 1990).
Reductions  in  mortality  will continue  in developing  countries  at a
moderate  rate,  assuming  further  increases  in educational  opportunities,
especially  those  for  women,  and in family  income. But  the  dramatic  declines
in  mortality  of the  past are  unlikely  --  unless  public  expenditures  are
concentrated  much  more heavily  on the  poor,  ensuring  delivery  of good quality
personal  health  services. Of critical  importance  are  family  planning,
nutritional  supplementation  for  children,  prenatal  and  obstetrical  care,  clean
water  and sanitation,  and  the  correct  use  of a small  number  of effective  drugs
(against  respiratory  infections,  tuberculosis,  and  malaria). But for  such
services  to be effective,  they  must  not only  be readily  available;  they  must
be sought,  understood  and  voluntarily  used  by their  clientele. Such
behavioral  change  will take  place  only if the  time  and  money  costs  of health
services  to the  poor decline  and/or  if they  receive  information  that  changes
their  underlying  tastes  and choices.
The  time  and  money  costs  will decline  only  if government  targets  its
health  spending  to the  poor,  making  basic  health  services  easily  accessible  in
the  rural  areas  and  urban  neighborhoods  where they  are  concentrated. For the
political  economy  reasons  given  above,  that  appears  unlikely. Similarly,  it
will be difficult  to inform  the  poor  and change  their  health  habits  (e.g.,
concerning  nutrition,  sanitation  and  drug  regimes  to handle  tuberculosis)
unless  their  educational  level  increases,  and this  too  requires  a heavy  and
unlikely  targeting  of public  (educational)  expenditures  to the  poor.  Indeed,
14  Mosley  and  Chen,  1984.13
if the  poor had access  to substantially  improved  and  heavily  subsidized
health,  education,  water  and  sanitation  facilities,  this  would drastically
improve  their  mortality  rates  and  therefore  the  overall  mortality  rates  of
their  countries,  but it  would  also imply  that a drastic  redistribution  of real
income  and  utility  had taken  place. In this  sense,  continued  high rates  of
health  improvement  and  income  redistribution  go hand-in-hand  --  and  both  will
be opposed  by powerful  groups  intent  on maintaining  the  distributional  status
quo.
The  Aging of the  Population  and its  Diseases
The  aging  of the  population  in  developing  countries,  a result  of
fertility  declines  over the  last  two  decades  and the  falling  death  rates,
means  that the  prevalence  of such  chronic  "adult"  diseases  as cancer,
hypertension,  and  heart  disease  (in  comparison  to parasitic  diseases  and
childhood  infectious  and  diarrheal  diseases)  is increasing. The  number  of
people  over  age 65 in developing  countries  will  more than  double  between  1985
and 2015.  By the  year 2025,  this  elderly  group  will exceed  10 percent  of the
population  in  many developing  countries,  a proportion  close  to that  in the
United  States  today."
Brazil  provides  a telling  example  of the  effects  of past
improvements  in  health  technology  and future  changes  in demographic  structure
on the  pattern  of disease. In 1950  heart  disease,  stroke,  cancer,  and
accidents  accounted  for  20 percent  of deaths  there;  in 1980  they  accounted  for
about  50 percent. The increase  in their  relative  contribution  over the  period
was due largely  to a decline  in the  proportion  of deaths  caused  by infectious
and  parasitic  disease. However,  the  changing  age structure  means  that from
now  on their  prevalence  is likely  to rise  as the  proportion  of the  elderly  in
the  population  increases. Age structure  changes  alone  imply  a 60 percent
increase  in deaths  due  to these  diseases  from 1980  to 2020.16
"  Mosley  et al., 1990  (Table  1) and  World  Bank,  1991.
16  Briscoe,  1990.14
Increases in age-specific death rates from some of these chronic
diseases will further change epidemiological patterns.  Age-specific death
rates are likely to rise because of increasing exposure to such risks as
smoking, poor diet, and urban pollution.  For example, increases in tobacco
consumption in the developing world over the last forty years are likely to
cause increases in the incidence of lung cancer comparable to the large
increases experienced in Great Britain in the 1960s and 1970s and in the
United States more recently (in both places the peak has already been
passed). 
These changing demographic and epidemiological patterns will put
new financial pressure on health systems in developing countries.  By 1980 in
Brazil, the allocation of public health resources for curative care had
increased to 85 percent of all spending (from 36 percent in 1965) and the
treatment of patients with heart disease accounted for an estimated 25 percent
of all in-patient costs.  Per capita health expenditures on persons over 60
were 3.5 times greater than the average for the population."
8
Unfortunately, continuing increases in spending on hospital
services for the care of chronic disease, while very expensive, will have
little impact on the high death rates in developing countries among the poor,
many of whom do not receive these services.' 9 The estimated cost-(per
"  On the expected rise in lung cancer in developing countries, see Jamison
and Mosley,  1991.
18  The cost burden could also rise  because of the spread of  AIDS, especially
in  Africa.  The cost of treating  AIDS patients in a  typical African country could
be as high as 10  percent of its current spending on health, even using what are
modest estimates of current spending per patient on  care (compared, for example,
with spending in the United States).  See Over, 1988.
'9  It is worth  clarifying at this point  that hospital  care need not be
costly,  and  even when  costly,  is  not  necessarily  cost-ineffective.  Small
hospitals  (say, of 50 beds or fewer) can be a critical part of an effective
overall health system in  which consumers can count on referral to higher levels
of the system.  In general in this text, however, the term hospital care refers
to hospitals  at the tertiary level, i.e. facilities offering specialized and
relatively high-cost services.  Even these  may be a necessary part of an overall
system  that is  cost-effective,  in the  sense of providing  the full  range of
services society desires at minimum costs.15
discounted healthy life years gained, DHLY) for such services as maternal and
child health care, immunization, Vitamin A supplementation, anti-smoking
campaigns and short-course therapy for tuberculosis is $50 to $150; the
estimated cost per life saved through curative treatment, e.g. at the extreme
for coronary bypass surgery and hospital management of lung and stomach
cancers, is over $1,000.20 The latter costs are likely to rise still higher
because of continuing pressure to use high-cost technologies, such as open
heart surgery, organ transplants and kidney dialysis.
Thus, the marginal cost of reducing mortality would appear to be
much lower if societies concentrated on diseases of the young  (and the poor),
and the marginal ber;efit,  in terms of years of life expectancy added, would be
much higher; hence such an allocation would seem to be efficient by these
criteria.  However, political pressures from influential groups have led most
societies to spend disproportionately on diseases of adults, particularly
curative hospital care, as described in detail in Section III.  The problem is
exacerbated because the young come disproportionately from lower income groups
and the old from middle and upper income groups; the problem is currently
being experienced in developed countries as well.  But its consequences are
(and will be) even more marked in developing countries, where income and
health disparities are greater.  The argument of Section I suggests that,
unless funding mechanisms change, the battle will be won by the wealthier,
older groups whose rapidly accelerating health care costs will use up public
resources that could more productively, and equitably, be spent on the younger
and poorer members of society.
The Endogeneity of Medical Research
This argument is strengthened if  we ask:  Why are expensive high
technology procedures aimed disproportionately at curing diseases of the old?
We believe that the allocation of research and developmental resources in this
direction is not accidental.  Instead, we believe that the allocation process
20  Jamison  and Mosley, 1991.  For a similar comparison using cost per life
saved, see Akin, Birdsall, and de Ferranti, 1987.16
within  the  medical  research  arena  is itself  endogenous,  governed  by the  same
political  economy  forces  described  above  with regard  to service  delivery.
A large  share  of  medical  research  is carried  on  by pharmaceutical  and
other  private  companies  in industrial  countries,  with the  object  of patenting
and selling  the  life-prolonging  drugs  and  equipment  that  they  develop. The
generous  health  insurance  coverage  received  by the old,  in part  because  of
their  political  power,  combined  with the  rapidly  aging  population  profile  in
these  countries,  assures  these  companies  that  they  will have a ready  market
for  their  new  products. On the  other  hand,  the  proportion  of children  in the
population  is declining,  and  they  come  disproportionately  from low  income
families  who are  less likely  to  have health  insurance  or to use  it  if  they
hLave  it.  Therefore,  companies  in developed  countries  have less incentive  to
direct  their  research  efforts  toward  children  than  toward  old people. As a
result,  the  developing  countries,  which  utilize  the  new  products  and  methods
that  emerge  from  this  process,  are  faced  with expensive  medical  technologies
aimed  at prolonging  the life  of the  old  rather  than  the  young,  and  also  with
political  pressures  from  the influential  older  groups  in society  for  public
spending  to make these  technologies  accessible  to them.
Other  Reasons  for  Pessimism
Other  reasons  for  pessimism  include  increased  fiscal  pressures  on the
government,  leading  it to divert  expenditures  from  health  care;  political
pressures  from  workers  that  often  cause  these  cuts  to be  made in inefficient
ways; and  cost  escalation  in health  care  which  diminish  the
productivity  of the  remaining  expenditures,  ceteris  paribus.
The  expenditure  of central  governments  in  developing  countries
rose  dramatically  from  5 percent  of the  gross  national  product  (GNP)  in 1945
to almost  20 percent  in the  early  1970s. It  has continued  to rise  since  then,
though  more slowly,  and in 1985  was about  22 percent  of GNP. 2'  Excluding
expenditures  on social  security  (which  are  higher  in industrial  countries)  the
21 World  Bank, 1988b.17
share  of the  public  sector  in GNP  in developing  countries  now  exceeds  that  in
industrial  countries. Jn general,  public  expenditures  have risen  faster  than
revenues,  so that  annual  deficits  have increased  from less  than  3 percent  to
over 4 percent of GNP since the early 1970s.22
The growing  deficits  do not  bode  well for  spending  on health  or on
education  --  which  has potentially  positive  effects  on health  in addition  to
its  other  benefits. Between  the  early  19709  and 1985,  the share  of central
government  budgets  in developing  countries  going  to health  fell  from 7  to 4
percent;  the  share  going  to education  fell  from  14 to 10  percent. 23 In some
countries,  particularly  in  Africa,  the  falling  shares  translated  into  real
overall  declines  and  even larger  dcclines  on a per  capita  basis. Though  state
and  local  governments  may  have taken  up some  of the slack,  the  dominance  of
the  central  government  in  most of the  developing  world  means  that  expenditures
of other  governmental  levels  are  not likely  to have  compensated.
Fiscal  pressures  in the  1980s  have also  contributed  to a reduction
ini  the  efficiency  of government  spending  on health. Though  in the  long  run
the  public  sector  may react  to reduced  resources  for  health  by altering  its
mix of services,  the  short  run  reaction  has  been to  maintain  the  product  mix
and  protect  spending  on personnel  while  cutting  expenditures  on nonpersonnel
operating  costs,  including  drugs,  fuel  for  vehicles,  and  maintenance  of
physical  plant  and  equipment.  People  are  not  easily  laid  off from  public
service  jobs.  Moreover,  scarce  foreign  exchange  is critical  to the  purchase
of drugs,  fuel,  and  equipment  but  not to the  payment  of  wages.  Because  the
nonpersonnel  inputs  are  usuvlly  a small  portion  of total  costs (less  than 20
percent),  they  must be cut  drastically  to reduce  total  spending  by a
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid.
24  See  Akin,  Birdsall,  and  de Ferranti,  1987.18
relatively  modest  amount. The  price  of a small  financial  saving  is  a large
drop in the  effectiveness  of the system  as a  whole.
Finally,  these  problems  have  been  exacerbated  by the  extension  of
health  insurance  without  adequate  cost  containment  measures,  in  many
countries. For  example,  in  Brazil  the  system  of automatic  reimbursement  by
the  public  sector  insurer  to  charges  of private  providers  has fueled  the  rapid
growth  of prices  and spending  on curative  care,  leaving  fewer  public
resources  than otherwise  to be spent  on  more  productive  basic  health  services
that are  not  covered  by insurance.
All of these  forces  lead  us to conclude  that  governments  will
simply  not perform  as effectively  in the  future  as they  have in the  past,  that
this is due  in part to growing  tensions  between  the  health  needs  of rich  and
poor,  old and  young,  in the  face  of increasingly  constricted  state  resources,
and  that  a radical  restructuring  of public-private  roles  may simultaneously
improve  equity,  efficiency,  and  health  outcomes.
III.  Examples --  and the Privatization Solution
This section  provides  examples  of  our assertions  above  that
allocations  within  the  health  sector  often  disregard  the  benevolent
prescriptions  of  welfare  theory  and  instead  fulfill  the  more pessimistic
predictions  of  public  choice  theory. The frequent  designation  of health
services  as "externality-generating  goods"  or  merit  goods  for  lower  income
groups  has provided  justification  for  government  intervention  along  classic
welfare  theory  lines. Our examples  suggest  that once  this intervention
begins,  ostensibly  to correct  for  market  imperfections,  to improve  health
outcomes  and to  benefit  poor  consumers,  more influential  consumer  and  producer
groups  are  often  able  to divert  resources  to the  costly  overprovision  of
services  that  predominantly  benefit  upper  income  groups  and  have a  much lower
social  rate  of return. The  influential  groups  are  typically  urban,  older,  and
require  costly,  curative  treatments. Thus  these  allocations  are  both
inefficient and inequitable.19
Second,  we show  how  a shift  of financing,  particularly  hospital
financing,  from  public  to private  sources  could  alleviate  this  pressure  on
public  resources,  thereby  permitting  reallocations  that  increase  equity  and
efficiency. Finally,  potential  pitfalls  of these  "privatization"  policies  are
considered,  as  well as  ways of guarding  against  the  pitfalls.
The efficiency  and  equity  criteria  discussed  in  Section  I and  used
in this section  deal  mainly  with the  question  of  who finances  quasi-public
services. Another  set of efficiency  considerations  deals  with the  question  of
who produces  these  services  and  how  much private  choice  and  public  controls
are involved. (For  the  distinction  and  connections  between  these  issues  see
Birdsall,  1992  and  James,  1990.) Below,  the  focus  is  on the  benefits  of
shifting  some  of the  financing  of quasi-public  services  to the  private  sector,
irrespective  of  whether  the  private  or public  sector  manages  and  provides  the
service  .25
Examples  of Public  Health  Spending  that  is Both  Inefficient  and  Inequitable
As discussed  in  Section  II,  efficiency  criteria  would dictate
government  expenditures  for  such  programs  as immunizations  (generating
externalities),  improved  water  supply  and  sanitation  (a  public  good),
monitoring  minimum  standards  for  pharmaceuticals  and  pesticides,  and
generating  publicity  about  lifestyles  that  promote  good  health,  (such  as anti-
smoking,  and  pro-nutrition  campaigns)  to  help consumers  make better-informed
utility-maximizing  decisions  (Birdsall,  1989). The financing  of basic  medical
services  to low income  groups  and  to rural  regions  that  cannot  support  a
private  competitive  market  in  medical  services  is  also  warranted  if people
care about  the  health  of others  and  wish to reduce  the  overall  incidence  of
illness  and  mortality. Maternal  and  child  health  programs  are  particularly
important  examples  of the  latter  since  these  affect  the  health  of entire
25  This also abstracts from the possible links between financing and
provision  that  can  arise  in  the  real  world  for  institutional  or  political  economy
reasons  (e.g.,  the  amount  raised  via  user  charges  may  be greater  if  the  provider
retains  control  over  the  resources,  private  provision  with  partial  public  subsidy
may be more sustainable  politically  than public  provision  with partial user
charges,  and  public  regulations  may accompany  public  subsidies).20
generations,  in  which  there  may be a large  societal  interest. Because  they
have  public  good characteristics,  all the  above  programs  are  not likely  to be
provided  by the  private  market;  hence  they  are a logical  candidate  for  public
funding.
We have  argued  that  these  basic  services  and  informational
programs  would  raise  health  standards  and  reduce  mortality  in the  most cost
effective  way. 26 They  would  most help  the  poor,  where  mortality  loss  is
currently  highest. They  would also  help the  young,  where  potential  gain  in
life  expectancy  is  the  greatest. On both efficiency  and equity  grounds,  these
are the  programs  that  merit  public  spending.
However,  in  many countries  we observe  relatively  little  public
health  money  going  to these  cost-effective  programs. Instead,  a large
proportion  of public  health  budgets  is spent  on  hospitals,  usually  located  in
urban  areas,  even in countries  where  the  vast  majority  of the  population  lives
in rural  areas  and suffers  from  high  mortality  rates  caused  by diseases  that
need  not  be treated  in  hospitals. In  virtually  all developing  countries,  the
percentage  of total  health  expenditure  for  curative  care is between  70 and  85
percent,  leaving  only 15  to 30 percent  for  spending  on preventive  care  and
community  services. This imbalance  also exists  in developed  countries,  but
the  disparity  between  population  profile  (many  children,  largely  rural)  and
spending  profile  (on  diseases  of adults  and  old  people  in cities)  is greater
in developing  countries.
More specifically,  in Bangladesh  in 1986  hospitals  consumed  over
80% of recurrent  public  health  spending. In Brazil  in  1982,  70%  of public
health  funds  was spent  on reimbursement  for  physician  and  hospital  care,
including  expensive  high  technology  procedures  (kidney  dialysis,  coronary  by-
pass,  Caesarian  sections). Tn Zimbabwe,  which  has tried  to  make its  health
sector  more egalitarian,  two-thirds  of Ministry  of Health  expenditures  are for
26  See  Birdsall, 1989 and Akin,  Birdsall and  de  Ferranti, 1987 for
comparisons  of the relative  cost-effective  of these  vs. hospital  services  in
reducing  mortality.21
hospital  services  and  60%  of these  expenditures  was absorbed  by four  hospitals
in  Harare.  In  Tanzania,  which  has  made a special  effort  to improve  rural
clinics,  60%  of the  recurrent  health  budget  was  nevertheless  spent  on
hospitals in .983-84.27
Typically,  these  hospitals  are  located  in  urban  centers  of
population,  they  serve  the  middle  and  upper  classes,  and superior  public
hospitals  (e.g.,  armed  forces  or social  security  hospitals)  serve  the  elites.
Most of their  patients  are  middle  aged  or older. Since  hospital  services  get
parcelled  out  to their  patients,  they  have a large  private  benefit  component
and  could  therefore  be financed  privately. But  once government  undertakes  the
task of financing  hospitals,  as it  has in  many countries,  this  crowds  out
private  resources  and  absorbs  a large  share  of the  public  budget,  because  of
the  high cost of  modern  medical  technology.
How Shifting  to Private  Spending  Could  Help
Suppose  instead  that  many hospitals  were turned  over to private
bodies,  with fees to  be covered  by  mandated  health  insurance  (which  might  be
administered  by government  but financed  by premiums  paid  by the  beneficiaries
or their  employers). Along  similar  lines,  user  charges  could  be instituted  at
the  remaining  public  facilities  and  use  of competitive  privately  managed
services  might improve  their  effectiveness. Public  funds  would then  be freed
up to  provide  the  externality-generating  health  prograis  listed  above  and  also
to subsidize  health  insurance  for  the  poor. We contend  that  these  changes
would  bring  about  a net improvement  in health  indicators,  far  beyond  that
which  would  be experienced  under  current  funding  mechanisms.
Examples  of countries  with small  experiments  along  these  lines  are
Zambia,  where the  university  hospital  at Lusaka  is being  turned  into  a
parastatal  that  charges  clients  for  services  (the  hope is that  public  funds
will be released  to finance  new  maternal,  child  health  and  family  planning
services);  Zimbabwe,  where a fee  has  been  introduced  for  patients  who bypass
27  These  examples  are from  selected  years in the 1980s  from  Griffin,
1989  and  World Bank,  1988b.22
lower  levels  of the  health  system  ane those  who want a  private  hospital  room;
and  Gambia,  where fees  charged  for  dru,gs  are  turned  over to  village
development  councils  for  further  health  improvement  (Akin,  Birdsall  and  de
Ferranti,  1987).  In Jamaica,  costs  declined  when housekeeping  and food
services  at  public  hospitals  were contracted  out  to private  firms  (Griffin,
1989  and  Lewis  and  Parker,  1991). In  Chile,  increased  reliance  on private
hospitals  during  the  past  decade  was accompanied  by a shift  toward  less
expensive  medical  personnel  (more  nurses  and  midwives,  fewer  doctors),  by
structural  changes  to improve  incentives,  and  by the targeting  of government
services  toward  primary  health  care  and  other  services  for  the  poor (Griffin,
1989).
Moreover,  to the  extent  that  reliance  on government  funds  has
limited  hospital  expansion,  access  to private  funds  (including  insurance
reimbursement)  may increase  the  supply  of hospital  services  and thereby
improve  overall  access  to  health  services. In the  Philippines  in the 1970s,
following  a  policy  change  allowing  private  expenditures,  the  greatest
expansion  of  hospitals  occurred  in the  poorr3t  served  regions  (Griffin,  1989)o
Pitfalls  and Problems
In any  privatization  program,  considerable  thought  and research
must be given  to potential  pitfalls  and  methods  of guarding  against  these
pitfalls. For  example,  private  hospitals  are sometimes  accused  of taking
actions  designed  to  maximize  their  profits,  at the  expense  of ill-informed
clients;  they  may downgrade  quality,  refuse  to carry  out important  but  costly
services,  recommend  an excessive  number  of lucrative  surgical  and  laboratory
procedures,  and deny  admissions  to indigent  patients. Possible  remadies  to
these  problems  include  regulations  that  require  hospitals  to provide  crucial
services  and  admit  poor  patients  (but  monitoring  may be difficult);  self-
regulation  and  peer  review  to safeguard  quality  and  reduce  excessive  surgery
(but  self-dealing,  logrolling  and  conflict  of interest  are  pitfalls  here);
reliance  on nonprofit  rather  than  for-profit  hospitals  (but  there  is little
evidence  to prove  that  nonprofits  are  more  trustworthy  than for-profits,23
although  some  economic  theories  of nonprofits  argue  that  this is the  case);
and  mandatory  insurance,  subsidized  for  the  poor,  so  no one  is left  out  of the
system  (but  this introduces  moral  hazard  problems,  discussed  below).
Another  pitfall  to avoid  is the  possibility  that  public  funds  will
not be reallocated  in an efficient,  equitable  way, even  after  private
financing  and service  delivery  is introduced. For  example,  in Brazil  about
half  of health  care expenditures  are  private,  many  private  hospitals  exist
(70%-80%  of the  total),  and  health  mairttenance  organizations  (HMOs)  privately
funded  by workers  and  their  employers  are  a  rapidly  growing  urban  phenomenon,
demonstrating  the  viability  of tne  market  in health. Nevertheless,  most of
the  public  health  funds  are spent  on public  hospital  procedures  with a large
private  benefit  component  (or  on public  reimbursement  of private  hospitals
that  provide  private  benefits),  for  upper  income  groups  (World  Bank,  1988a).
In general  the  availability  of  medical  insurance  plays  a  key role
in all these  scenarios  that shift  responsibility  for  hospital  care to the
private  sector. Insurance,  of course,  raises  the  problem  of  moral  hazard,
hence  overspending,  which  must be addressea  or the  efficiency  gains  just
described  will be reduced  and  perhaps  eliminated. Indeed,  uncontrolled
private  hospitals  together  with  mandatory  medical  insurance  may  be the  worst
combination  of all from  this  point  of  view (Birdsall,  1989). Procedures  for
dealing  with this  problem  are:  requiring  co-insurance  (e.g.,  an annual
deductible  and/or  a co-payment  for  each treatment),  exempting  small  costs  from
coverage,  paying  hospitals  on the  basis  of diagnosis  rather  than  procedures,
reviewing  recommendations  for  surgery  and  unusually  high surgical  rates,  and
structuring  in competition  among  insurance  carriers  --  in  general,  greater
reliance  on  market  incentives  to contain  costs. At the  same  time,  it  must be
recognized  that  cost escalation  in the  health  field  is a problem  whose  first-
best solution  has  not  yet been  fourd  in  any  country. Perhaps  all  that is
possible  is  a second-best  solution,  in  which  the  burden  does  not fall
disproportionately  on the  public  treasury  or on the  lowest  income  groups  in
society.24
Conclusion  and  Political  Strategies
Our  policy  recommendation  is thus  for  a reallocation  of public
funds  to public  goode  and  to quasi-public  goods  targeted  to lower  income
groups,  together  with a shift  of responsibility  for  "private"  services  to the
private  sector. The shift  involves  expanded  financial  and  producing
responsibilities  for  the  private  sector,  comb4ned  with a reallocation  of
government  funds  within  the  public  sector. For the  reasons  given  above,  this
holds  out  the  promise  of increasing  both  efficiency  (i.e.,  greater  improvement
in health  indicators  at lower  cost)  and  equity  (i.e.,  greater  health  gains  for
the  poor).  The  central  premise  of this  paper  is  that in the  contemporary
health  context,  equity  is a  necessary  pre-condition  for  efficiency,  and a
reassignment  of public  and  private  roles  is one  of the few  economically  and
politically  feasible  ways to accomplish  both  goals  and  continue  into  the
future  the  rapid  mortality  decline  and  health  improvement  that  developing
countries  have experienced  in the  past.
In the  absence  of political  change,  howev.  -,  this shift  w; l not
be easy  to accomplish,  since  the  current  "misbehavior"  of government
(inefficiently  financing  private  health  and  other  services  that  benefit
influential  groups)  has come  about  precisely  because  people  with political
power  gain  therefrom  and  will resist  relinquishing  this source  of real  income.
The current  situation  is the  outcome  of a political  process,  and  possibly  a
political  equilibrium,  in  which  each  group  has tried  to  maximize  the  utility
it can  extract  from  the system: the  pay-offs  for  the  rich  are superior
hospitals  while  the  poor  get low  quality  and  limited  rural  health  services.
If  we now  disturb  or constrain  one  element  of this  equilibrium,  other  elements
will change  as a  reaction,  so  that  the  end  result  may  be quite  different  from
what was sought  with the  initial  step.
For example,  suppose  the  upper  classes  feel  their  benefits  have
declined  when a shift  is  made from  funding  private  to public  goods  by
government  (e.g.  from financing  medical  operations  to financing  malaria
control  and  immunization  campaigns);  they  may then  lobby  successfully  for  a25
corresponding  tax  cut, so that  government  has  less to spend,  or for  a shift  in
the  structure  of taxes,  so that  relatively  more is collected  from  the lower
classes.  (Tax  cuts in the  Reagan  years  in the  U.S. could  thus  be  viewed,  in
part,  as a reaction  to the  build  up of  poverty  programs  in the 1960s  and  early
1970s)o Or, elites  may try  to recapture  their  higher  real income  in other
ways,  e.g.  by increasing  the level  of bribery  and  corruption  elsewhere  in the
economy. Ultimately,  large  changes  in  the  distribution  of benefits  from
government  spending  will only  occur  if  there  is a corresponding  change  in the
distribution  of political  power. 28
While the  above  comments  sound  pessimistic,  there  are  a few
sources  of hope.  First,  as discussed  in Section  I,  many inefficient  and
inequitable  policies  are  stimulated  and  perpetuated  by imperfect  information.
The "losers"  do not always  know  how  much they  are  losing  and  the "winners"
incur  costs  to hide information  from  them.  Spreading  more accurate
information  may thus in itself  alter  the  feasible  political  equilibrium.
Along  similar  lines,  politicians  do not  know  people's  preferences  or the
intensity  of these  preferences  with certainty,  and  if their  perceptions  of
preferences  are  changed,  the  policies  they  deem  politically  optimal  will also
change.
Second,  the  current  fiscal  crisis  in  many countries  may  make
politicians  more willing  to consider  cost-effective  reallocations,  even  if
these  hurt some  of their  supporters. The fiscal  crisis  may also indirectly
28  For  example, as the urban working class grew in  size and became
enfranchised  in nineteenth  and twentieth  century Europe, they also acquired
greater  power  to influence  government  policies. Enfranchisement  of  black  voters
in the U.S. South,  which accelerated  with the Civil Rights  Act of 1964,  has
increased the access of blacks to the benefits of state-sponsored  social
programs. Obviously,  changes  in the  internal  power  structure  are  very slow  and
difficult to achieve.  On the other hand, a temporary  change in power can
sometimes  be  multiplied  and  become  permanent  if  it is  used  to  alter  the  long  run
rules of  the  game via  constitutional  change, precedent-setting  judicial
interpretations,  irreversible  extensions  of  voting  rights,  reapportionment,  etc.26
reduce  subsidies  to the  rich  by leading  them  to abandon  the  public  systems  as
these  deteriorate  in quality.
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Third,  if service  delivery  becomes  more efficient,  as a
consequence  of the  privatization  policies  discussed  in this  paper,  this  will
free  up some  resources  that  could  be used (at  least  theoretically)  to  make
everyone  better  off.  If the  surplus  is distributed  in such  a  way  that there
are  more  winners  than losers,  including  some  influential  winners,  this could
offset  political  pressure  to once  again  expand  the  public  sector
inefficiently.
Finally,  the  power  structure  may be changed  through  the
intervention  of external  actors  such  as local  and international  NGOs (non-
profit  non governmental  organizations),  the  World Bank  and  other  aid  agencies
--  although  the scope  for  action  here  is obviously  limited. External  actors
are  probably  most  effective  over  the  long  run  when they  provide  new
information  and  new  ways of looking  at old  problems.
29  For  example,  the  fiscal  crisis  in  Mexico  appears  to  have contributed  to
the  deterioration  of  the  public university system and  the  evolution of
financially  autonomous  elite  private  institutions;  these  now  cater  to the rich
and  reduce  public  spending  on high-income  university  students.27
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Table  1.  Crude  Death  Rate  and  Life  Expectancy  at  Birth,
By Region,  1950-1985
Crude  Death  Rate  Life  Expectancy  at  Birth
(deaths  per 1.000  persons  per  year)  (years)
1950  1965  1980  '85-'90  '50-'55  '85-'90
Sub-Saharan  29.3  22.8  17.7  15.3  51.5
Africa
Middle  East/  24.0  18.1  12.6  10.9  59.0
North  Africa
South  Asia  28.8  20.6  14.5  12.2  38.9  55.8
East  Asia  27.1  16.3  10.5  7.3  67.9
(exc.  China)
China  27.3  16.0  7.9  6.7  40.8  69.0
Latin  Amer./  16.6  11.7  8.5  7.2  66.6
Caribbean
Developing  41.1  59.1
Countries
Indust.  10.5  9.6  9.1  9.3  65.8  73.1
Countries
Source: Reproduced  from  Birdsall,  1989: World  Bank  Development  Report  (New  York: Oxford
University  Press,  1984),  5;  World  Bank  projections,  1985-1990  (for  death  rates);  and
United  Nations,  World  Population  Prospects: Estimates  and  Proiections  as  Assessed  in 1984
(New  York:  United  Nations,  1986)  (for  life  expectancies).7Lggire  l.  SehamtLc  R.apteseanat40u  of
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